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Abstract. The growing use of IoT devices in organizations has increased the 
number of attack vectors available to attackers due to the less secure nature of 
the devices. The widely adopted bring your own device (BYOD) policy which 
allows an employee to bring any IoT device into the workplace and attach it to 
an organization's network also increases the risk of attacks. In order to address 
this threat, organizations often implement security policies in which only the con-
nection of white-listed IoT devices is permitted. To monitor adherence to such 
policies and protect their networks, organizations must be able to identify the IoT 
devices connected to their networks and, more specifically, to identify connected 
IoT devices that are not on the white-list (unknown devices). In this study, we 
applied deep learning on network traffic to automatically identify IoT devices 
connected to the network. In contrast to previous work, our approach does not 
require that complex feature engineering be applied on the network traffic, since 
we represent the “communication behavior” of IoT devices using small images 
built from the IoT devices’ network traffic payloads. In our experiments, we 
trained a multiclass classifier on a publicly available dataset, successfully identi-
fying 10 different IoT devices and the traffic of smartphones and computers, with 
over 99% accuracy. We also trained multiclass classifiers to detect unauthorized 
IoT devices connected to the network, achieving over 99% overall average de-
tection accuracy. 
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), Cyber Security, Deep Learning, IoT De-
vice Identification 
1 Introduction 
The term “Internet of Things” is defined as a group of low computing devices capable 
of sensing and/or actuating, abilities which extend Internet connectivity beyond that of 
standard devices like computers, laptops, and smartphones. The number of IoT devices 
connected to the Internet has already surpassed the number of humans on the planet, 
and by 2025, the number of devices is expected to reach around 75.44 billion worldwide  
[1]. IoT devices are accompanied by new vulnerabilities due to a lack of security aware-
ness among vendors and an absence of governmental standards for IoT devices [2]. As 
these devices become part of existing organizational networks, they expose these net-
works to adversaries. By using search engines like Shodan [3], hackers can easily locate 
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IoT devices and target them due to their lack of security. In addition, the many IoT 
devices connected to the organization network may be used by adversaries during a 
targeted attack on the organizational network. [4, 5]. An important first step in reducing 
the threat such devices pose and increasing security is to identify the IoT devices con-
nected to the organizational network.  
 
It is a challenge for organizations to identify the various IoT devices connected to 
their networks. Policies like the popular bring your own device (BYOD) policy exac-
erbate this, as employees can bring their devices into the workplace, any of which might 
pose a threat when connected to the organizational network [6, 7, 8]. Moreover, as dif-
ferent IoT devices use different protocols to communicate with other devices and/or to 
their respective servers, it is difficult to both maintain the security of the devices and 
perform post-incident investigations using traditional methodologies [9, 10]. In order 
to address these challenges, organizations need a means of identifying the IoT devices 
(both known and unknown to network administrators) connected to their networks; the 
ability to do so will enable organizations to more effectively handle IoT device security 
issues and determine whether the behavior of the connected IoT devices is normal. 
 
Previous research proposed ways of identifying IoT devices by analyzing the net-
work traffic [13, 14, 15]. Because existing methods are based on machine learning tech-
niques, they require feature engineering, i.e., extraction, selection, and tuning of the 
features. This requires manual input from domain experts, which is both prone to errors 
and expensive. Existing approaches require multiple sessions to identify known and 
unauthorized IoT devices and hence require more time. As they are based on a multi-
stage model, the architecture is more complex. Our approach addresses these limita-
tions; it has a simple architecture, requires a single session to detect and identify known 
and unauthorized IoT devices, and is free from the overhead of feature engineering and 
the errors that may be added during feature engineering. 
 
In this paper, we propose an approach that allows us to identify known IoT devices 
in the network; by using the same approach, we can also identify the presence of any 
unknown IoT devices in the network, as shown in our second experiment. It is easy to 
spoof MAC addresses, and the use of DHCP by organizations makes it difficult to iden-
tify IoT devices in the network using traditional approaches [11, 12]. Therefore, our 
approach is focused on the TCP content of the packets exchanged by devices as opposed 
to the header of the packets. While other research [13, 14, 15] has proposed methods 
aimed at tackling the problem of identifying IoT devices in organizational networks, 
our approach provides a more generic and less complex solution with accuracy compa-
rable or greater than that of existing approaches.  
 
The contributions of our research are as follows: 
 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply deep learning tech-
niques on the TCP payload of network traffic for IoT device classification 
and identification. 
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 Our approach can be used for the detection of white-listed IoT devices in 
the network traffic.  
 When using our approach, only a single TCP session is needed to detect 
the source IoT device, in contrast to existing approaches which require 
multiple TCP sessions to detect the source IoT device.  
 Our approach is simple in terms of architecture and free from feature en-
gineering overhead. 
2 Related Work 
Machine learning has been used by researchers to classify network traffic for the pur-
pose of identifying the services being used on the source computers [16, 17]. Transfer 
learning techniques have been used for network traffic classification, with promising 
results [18]. The use of machine learning and deep learning algorithms to detect mali-
cious and benign traffic has also been demonstrated [19, 20]. Another study [21] exam-
ined machine learning techniques that can be used by adversaries to automatically iden-
tify user activities based on profiling the traffic of smart home IoT device communica-
tions. 
 
In [13], the authors proposed a machine learning approach to identify IoT traffic 
based on the features of a TCP session. Each TCP session was represented by a vector 
of features from the network, transport, and application layers, and other features were 
added based on publicly available data, such as Alexa Rank [22] and GeoIP [23]. In 
this study, nine different IoT devices were classified based on different machine learn-
ing models using 33,468 data instances. For each classifier, an optimal threshold value 
was obtained, which helped identify which class the traffic belonged to. In addition, for 
each IoT device class, a threshold value for the number of sequences of TCP sessions 
was obtained, enabling the authors to determine the IoT device class for any input ses-
sion. Although high accuracy (over 99%) was achieved for the task of correctly identi-
fying the IoT device, the study had limitations in that the features selected from the 
application layer were limited to HTTP and TLS protocols only, and there is a need for 
various types of machine learning models and different numbers of TCP session se-
quences (threshold values) in order to identify different IoT devices.  
 
Sivanathan et al.[15] characterized the IoT traffic based on the statistical attributes, 
such as port numbers, activity cycles, signaling patterns, and cipher suites.  They pro-
posed a multistage machine learning model to classify the IoT devices, using flow level 
features like the flow volume, flow duration, flow rate, sleep time, DNS interval, and 
NTP interval extracted from network traffic. In this experiment, the authors used 50,378 
labeled instances to classify 28 IoT devices and one non-IoT device class and obtained 
over 99% accuracy. A limitation of this work was its complex multistage architecture 
and the need for a subject matter expert to decide the features to be used. Dependency 
on features such as the port number and domains can be risky as they can easily be 
altered by vendors.  
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Meidan et al.[14] applied machine learning techniques to detect white-listed IoT de-
vices in the network traffic. Ten IoT devices were considered in this study, and in each 
of the experiments performed, one IoT device was removed from the white-list and 
treated as an unknown IoT device. More than 300 features were used to train the model, 
including features from different network layers and statistical features. They found 
that the 10 features most heavily influencing classification were mainly statistical fea-
tures derived from the time to live (TTL) value. In this study, white-listed IoT device 
types were classified to their specific types with an average accuracy of 99%. As this 
approach is based on the work of [13], it inherits its limitations (as described above).  
3 Proposed Methodology 
3.1 Approach 
The two main approaches used in the domain of network traffic classification are the 
rule-based approach and an approach based on statistical and behavioral features [24, 
25]. The rule-based approach focuses on the port number of the service, which cannot 
be relied upon today. Statistical and behavioral-based features also have limitations, 
including the need to identify the correct features and preprocess those features to feed 
into the machine learning model, both of which require significant domain knowledge. 
 
In this paper, we propose a novel approach which is based on representation learning. 
We conducted two experiments, one aimed at identifying IoT devices in the network 
traffic and the other aimed at identifying connected IoT devices that are not on the 
white-list (unknown devices) in the organizational network. The intuition behind this 
work is the small length and particular patterns of data transferred from IoT devices 
compared to that of computers and smartphones which use different protocols and have 
variable data lengths. The scope of this research is limited to IoT devices that utilize 
the TCP protocol for communication. However, we believe this method can also be 
applied to IoT devices that communicate using other protocols, including Bluetooth, 
ZigBee, CoAP, and others. Our research addresses the limitations of the previous re-
search performed by other researchers (as described in the previous section). 
3.2 Data Preprocessing 
In the preprocessing phase, we convert the network traffic available in pcap (packet 
capture) format to grayscale images. Our focus is on the payloads of the TCP sessions 
which are exchanged between IoT devices, as shown in Figure 1.  The data processing 
step is same for both of the experiments. 
 
The TCP session payloads are converted to images using the following steps: 
 
Step 1: In this step, multiple pcap files are created from a single large pcap file based 
on the sessions (i.e., a group of packets with the same source and destination IP address, 
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source and destination port number, and protocol belong to a single session). The output 
is comprised of multiple pcap files where each pcap file represents a single session. A 
tool like SplitCap [26] can be utilized to perform this step. As our scope is limited to 
the TCP protocol, pcap files with UDP session data are removed. 
Step 2: After obtaining the pcap files (as described above in step 1), the files are 
divided into groups based on the source MAC address. At the end of this step, we will 
have multiple folders, each of which contains the pcap files that originated from a par-
ticular MAC address. We then identify the folders that contain the traffic of the IoT 
devices used in our experiments based on the source MAC addresses. 
Step 3: We remove the header of each of the packets present in a single pcap file 
and convert it into a bin file (binary file) which will contain the content of the TCP 
payload in the form of hexadecimal values. Files with no data will also get generated 
for cases in which there was no communication in the TCP session; in this step, these 
files will be removed, along with any duplicate files. 
Step 4: We adjust the file size so that each bin file is 784 bytes; if the file size is 
more than 784 bytes, we trim it, and we pad files that are less than 784 bytes with 0x00 
bytes. 
Step 5: This is an optional step where bin files are converted to 28 × 28 pixel gray-
scale images where each pixel represents a two hexadecimal number (in total represent-
ing 1,568 hexadecimal numbers in 784 bytes) as shown in Figure 1. The images gener-
ated for each class are converted to IDX files which are similar to MNIST dataset files 
[27] for ease when training the deep learning model. 
 
Fig. 1. Converting network traffic into image representation 
Figure 2 presents four random images generated based on the above steps for a Bel-
kin Wemo motion sensor and Amazon Echo. From the images, it is evident that each 
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IoT device has a distinct pattern of communication when compared to other IoT de-
vices.  
 
 
Fig. 2.Visualization of the communication patterns of two different IoT devices 
3.3 Dataset and Environment 
In order to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model, we trained a single layer 
fully connected neural network. The dataset used in our experiments came from the IoT 
Trace Dataset [15]. The complete dataset contains 218,657 TCP sessions, 110,849 TCP 
sessions from IoT devices and 107,808 TCP sessions from non-IoT devices. As our 
approach is based on deep learning, we only considered devices with over 1,000 TCP 
sessions. We divided the reduced dataset into three sets, i.e., training, validation, and 
test sets. In both the validation and test set, 10% of the data was randomly chosen. Table 
1 contains details on the subset of the IoT Trace dataset used in our experiments (after 
the above mentioned preprocessing steps were performed).  
Table 1. Dataset used in our experiments 
Device Name MAC Address Device Type Sessions 
in Train-
ing Set 
Sessions in 
Validation 
Set 
Sessions in 
Test Set 
Total 
Sessions 
Belkin Wemo motion sensor ec:1a:59:83:28:11 IoT 7313 903 813 9029 
Amazon Echo 44:65:0d:56:cc:d3 IoT 2903 358 323 3584 
Samsung SmartCam 00:16:6c:ab:6b:88 IoT 3285 405 365 4055 
Belkin Wemo switch ec:1a:59:79:f4:89 IoT 2759 341 307 3407 
Netatmo Welcome 70:ee:50:18:34:43 IoT 1894 234 210 2338 
Insteon camera 00:62:6e:51:27:2e IoT 2177 269 242 2688 
Withings Aura smart sleep sensor 00:24:e4:20:28:c6 IoT 906 112 100 1118 
Netatmo weather station 70:ee:50:03:b8:ac IoT 5695 703 633 7031 
PIX-STAR photoframe e0:76:d0:33:bb:85 IoT 31199 3852 3467 38518 
Non-IoT devices N/A Non - IoT 20035 2474 2226 24735 
 
7 
3.4 Model Architecture 
In our proposed model, we have only an input layer and an output layer. This makes 
our approach less complex than existing approaches for classifying IoT devices. The 
input to the model in both experiments is a 28 × 28 pixel (i.e., 784 pixel value) grayscale 
image, or if byte values are directly supplied, the input layer has 784 neurons. As we 
are classifying nine IoT devices along with one non-IoT device class in experiment one, 
the output layer will have ten neurons, as shown in Figure 3. In our second experiment, 
which is aimed at detecting unauthorized IoT devices (which is not part of white-list), 
we focus on the traffic of nine IoT devices and train nine models with similar architec-
tures, keeping one class of IoT traffic out of the training set each time and treating the 
excluded IoT class traffic as an unknown IoT device to demonstrate the feasibility of 
our approach. Hence, in the output layer of the second experiment we have eight neu-
rons. 
 
 For the input and output layers we initialized weights using a normal distribution. 
The activation function used in the input layer is ReLU, and the activation function in 
the output layer is softmax. We used the Adam optimizer, along with categorical cross-
entropy as the loss and accuracy as the evaluation metric (for the validation set) [28, 
29, 30, 31, 32]. We also validated the results by adding intermediate hidden layers with 
different parameters, but the results were more or less the same. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Neural network model architecture 
3.5 Evaluation Matrix  
To evaluate our model on the test set we used: accuracy (A), precision (P), recall (R), 
and the F1 score (F1) as our evaluation matrix. The formula used to calculate each of 
these parameters is shown in Equation 1, where the TP, TN, FP, and FN are respectively 
the true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative. 
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A =
TP + TN
TP + FP +  FN + TN
 , P =
TP
TP + FP
 
  (1) 
R =
TP
TP +  FN
, F1 =
2 × P × R
P + R
 
4 Evaluation 
Experiment 1: Detection of IoT Devices 
Figure 4 presents the model accuracy and loss obtained on the validation set after train-
ing a multiclass classifier for 25 epochs, with a batch size of 100. Based on the graphs, 
it is clear that the optimum accuracy (99.87%) and optimum loss were obtained after 
seven epochs. Hence, we retrained the model (to avoid overfitting) for seven epochs 
and found that the accuracy for the test set was 99.86%, which is greater than or equal 
to that of existing approaches. The confusion matrix for each IoT device and the non-
IoT device is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Test set’s confusion matrix 
Actual IoT device/classified as 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0- Non-IoT devices 2226 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1- Amazon Echo 1 812 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2- Samsung SmartCam 2 0 321 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 0 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4- Netatmo Welcome 0 0 0 0 306 1 0 0 0 0 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor 1 0 0 0 0 0 241 0 0 0 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 628 5 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3465 
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Fig. 4. Model accuracy and loss for validation set 
Experiment 2: Detection of Unauthorized IoT Devices 
For this experiment, the dataset included the traffic of nine IoT devices. We trained 
nine different multiclass classifiers with the architecture shown in Figure 3(b); each 
time, eight classes were used for training classifier, excluding one class which was con-
sidered an unknown IoT device. We determined the minimum number of epochs re-
quired by each classifier to obtain the maximum accuracy on the validation set. 
Table 3. Minimum number of epochs required to obtain maximum accuracy on the validation 
set 
Unknown Devices Minimum 
Number of 
Epochs 
Thresholds Test Set  
Accuracy (%) 
Amazon Echo 9 0.97 98.9 
Samsung SmartCam 27 0.99 97.9 
Belkin Wemo switch 5 0.77 99.3 
Netatmo Welcome 18 0.99 98.3 
Insteon camera 8 0.92 98.8 
Withings Aura smart sleep sensor 6 0.80 99.8 
Netatmo weather station 3 0.76 99.8 
PIX-STAR photoframe 3 0.87 99.8 
Belkin Wemo motion sensor 3 0.90 99.0 
 
After determining the minimum number of epochs for each classifier, the classifiers 
were retrained using their respective minimum number of epochs. When applied to a 
single instance, each classifier outputs a vector of posterior probabilities with a length 
of eight. Each probability value denotes the likelihood of the instance to originate from 
one of the eight IoT devices. We used the threshold value to derive the classification of 
an instance, such that given the vector of probabilities, if any single probability that 
exceeds the threshold value exists, the instance is classified as originating from one of 
the eight IoT devices, depending on the index of the probability in the output vector; 
otherwise, that instance is classified as unknown. The threshold values were derived 
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using the validation set on the classifiers trained, which maximizes accuracy (A) (see 
Equation 1). The threshold values for each classifier are described in Table 3. Higher 
threshold values indicate that the classifier is able to bifurcate unknown devices with 
greater confidence. A confusion matrix for each classifier is presented in Appendix A. 
5 Conclusion 
In this research, we presented an approach that uses deep learning to identify both 
known and unauthorized IoT devices in the network traffic, identifying 10 different IoT 
devices and the traffic of smartphones and computers, with over 99% accuracy, and 
achieving over 99% overall average accuracy to detect unauthorized IoT devices con-
nected to the network. We also demonstrated some of the advantages of our approach, 
including its simplicity (compared to existing approaches) and the fact that it requires 
no feature engineering (eliminating the associated overhead). The proposed approach 
is also generic as it focuses on the network traffic payload of the different IoT devices 
as opposed to the header of the packets; thus our method is applicable to any IoT device, 
regardless of the protocol used for communication. In future research, we plan to ex-
plore applications of our approach to additional scenarios, possibly including different 
network protocols that do not use a TCP/IP network stack for communication. 
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Appendix A: Confusion matrix for the detection of unauthorized IoT devices  
Actual IoT device/classified as 1 (U) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo (unknown) 802 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0.93 0.986 0.958 
2- Samsung SmartCam 0 323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.988 1 0.994 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4- Netatmo Welcome 1 0 0 306 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.997 0.998 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor  0 0 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 1 1 1 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 1 1 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 626 0 1 0.989 0.994 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3415 0.998 0.985 0.991 
       Weighted Avg 0.99 0.989 0.989 
           
Actual IoT device/classified as 1 2 (U) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo 812 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.999 0.999 
2- Samsung SmartCam (unknown) 0 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 73 0.804 0.774 0.789 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4- Netatmo Welcome 0 1 0 306 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.997 0.998 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor 0 0 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 1 1 1 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 1 1 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 626 0 1 0.989 0.994 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 3415 0.979 0.985 0.982 
       Weighted Avg 0.979 0.979 0.979 
           
Actual IoT device/classified as 1 2 3 (U) 4 5 6 7 8 9 Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo 811 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.998 0.999 
2- Samsung SmartCam 0 322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.994 0.997 0.995 
3- Belkin Wemo switch (unknown) 0 2 363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.894 0.995 0.942 
4- Netatmo Welcome 0 0 1 306 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.997 0.998 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor  0 0 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 1 1 1 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 1 1 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 626 0 1 0.989 0.994 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 3434 1 0.99 0.995 
       Weighted Avg 0.994 0.993 0.993 
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Actual IoT device/classified as 1 2 3 4 (U) 5 6 7 8 9 Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo 813 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.998 1 0.999 
2- Samsung SmartCam 0 323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.883 1 0.938 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4- Netatmo Welcome (unknown) 2 43 0 259 0 1 0 0 2 0.814 0.844 0.829 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor  0 0 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 0.996 1 0.998 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 1 1 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 626 0 1 0.989 0.994 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 0 3415 0.999 0.985 0.992 
       Weighted Avg 0.985 0.983 0.984 
 
Actual IoT device/classified as 1 2 3 4 5 (U) 6 7 8 9 Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo 812 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.985 0.999 0.992 
2- Samsung SmartCam 0 323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.956 1 0.977 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4- Netatmo Welcome 0 0 0 306 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.997 0.998 
5- Insteon camera (unknown) 12 15 0 0 144 0 0 37 2 0.966 0.686 0.802 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor  0 0 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 1 1 1 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 1 1 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 626 6 0.944 0.989 0.966 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3465 0.998 0.999 0.999 
       Weighted Avg 0.988 0.988 0.987 
 
Actual IoT device/classified as 1 2 3 4 5 6 (U) 7 8 9 Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo 813 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2- Samsung SmartCam 0 323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4- Netatmo Welcome 0 0 0 307 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor  (unknown) 0 0 0 0 0 239 0 0 3 1 0.988 0.994 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 1 1 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 626 7 1 0.989 0.994 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3467 0.997 1 0.999 
       Weighted Avg 0.998 0.998 0.998 
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Actual IoT device/classified as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (U) 8 9 Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo 813 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2- Samsung SmartCam 0 323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 365 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4- Netatmo Welcome 0 0 0 306 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.997 0.998 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor  0 0 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 1 1 1 
7- Netatmo weather station (unknown) 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0.952 1 0.976 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 626 6 1 0.989 0.994 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3464 0.998 0.999 0.999 
       Weighted Avg 0.998 0.998 0.998 
 
Actual IoT device/classified as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (U) 9 Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo 812 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.999 0.999 
2- Samsung SmartCam 0 323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 364 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.997 0.999 
4- Netatmo Welcome 0 0 0 306 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.997 0.998 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 210 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor  0 0 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 1 1 1 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 1 1 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe (unknown) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 622 11 0.995 0.983 0.989 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3467 0.997 1 0.998 
       Weighted Avg 0.998 0.998 0.998 
 
Actual IoT device/classified as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (U) Precision Recall F1-Score 
1- Amazon Echo 810 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0.996 0.998 
2- Samsung SmartCam 0 322 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.997 0.998 
3- Belkin Wemo switch 0 0 364 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.997 0.999 
4- Netatmo Welcome 0 0 0 306 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.997 0.998 
5- Insteon camera 0 0 0 0 209 0 0 0 1 1 0.995 0.998 
6- Withings Aura smart sleep sensor  0 0 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 1 1 1 
7- Netatmo weather station 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 1 1 1 
8- PIX-STAR photoframe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 633 0 0.92 1 0.958 
9- Belkin Wemo motion sensor (unknown) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 3412 0.998 0.984 0.991 
       Weighted Avg 0.991 0.99 0.991 
 
